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Abstract 
 
Persisting negative thoughts are considered a hallmark feature of depression. Recent 
information-processing approaches have begun to uncover the underlying mechanisms of 
depressive rumination. Despite marked advances in this area, there is a lack of integration 
between psychopathology and cognitive (neuro)science research. We propose the „impaired 
disengagement‟ hypothesis as a unifying framework between both approaches. The core tenet 
of our model is that prolonged processing of self-referent material is due to impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative self-referent information. We discuss the empirical 
evidence for this framework and outline future ways in which the causal predictions of this 
model can be tested. The proposed framework can account for the effectiveness of various 
treatments for depression and may aid in devising new interventions to target depressive 
cognition. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Persistent negative cognition is a hallmark feature of depression and anxiety that is 
assumed to play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of affective disorders 
(Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Watkins, 2008). Although engaging in prolonged and repetitive 
thinking about one‟s self in relation to the social environment, which  could increase upon the 
encounter of stressful events or emotional states, is in essence a constructive and normative 
process, this process can become exaggerated and associated with detrimental effects in 
several forms of psychopathology (Watkins, 2008). In this article we focus on an important 
form of depressive cognition, rumination, and we propose a new theory based on information-
processing and affective neuroscience research to account for heightened levels of rumination 
observed in depression. This new theory holds important implications with regard to strategies 
that can directly target the mechanisms underlying rumination.   
It is important to mention that, at the outset, we clearly distinguish between cognitive 
processes and products, as proposed by Ingram and colleagues (Ingram, Miranda & Segal, 
1998). Attentional control, as measured by experimental tasks, is considered a process 
influencing rumination as measured by questionnaires. Although definitions of rumination 
(see below) sometimes refer to rumination as “a process” of thinking, we regard rumination as 
a certain style of self-referential thinking. The negative cognitions associated with a 
ruminative thinking style are seen as cognitive products.  
 
1.1 Depression and Negative Cognition 
Cognitive theories have emphasized the role of negative cognitions in the etiology and 
maintenance of depression. According to Beck‟s influential cognitive theory (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1976), depression is characterized by the presence of negative schemas, 
defined as mental representations of past experiences, containing dysfunctional attitudes about 
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the self (Beck, 1967, 1995). These underlying schemas have an important influence on the 
way information is processed, guiding one‟s interpretation, attention and memory for 
personally relevant negative experiences (Clark et al., 1999). The activation of the schemas in 
confrontation with stressful life events and negative mood states leads to specific negative 
automatic thoughts including negative cognitions about the self, the world and the future (the 
so called negative cognitive triad, Beck, 1995). The negative cognitions, in turn, further 
maintain and exacerbate negative affect, leading to a vicious cognitive-affective circle with 
enhanced depressive symptoms (Teasdale, 1988; Watkins, 2008).  
Although the negative content of depressive cognition is proposed to play an important 
role in the  vulnerability for depression (Alloy et al., 2000; Clark et al., 1999), recent 
theoretical models highlight the importance of underlying cognitive processes that might be 
responsible for elevated and persistent negative cognition and affect (Joormann, Yoon, & 
Zetsche, 2007). Research has demonstrated that the activation of negative cognitions or 
representations in working memory  may not necessarily  result in increased and prolonged 
negative affect. Instead, it is the ability to regulate negative affect thatplays an instrumental 
role  in determining which individuals are at risk to experience prolonged negative affect upon 
encounter of stress (Joormann et al., 2007). The regulation of negative mood however seems 
to be dependent upon the efficient exercise of working memory functions involved in the 
regulation of negative information. In a related manner, individual differences in the cognitive 
control functions are proposed to be related to a ruminative thinking style (Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000).  
 
1.2 Rumination 
In recent years, rumination has been defined as “behaviors and thoughts that focus 
one‟s attention on one‟s depressive symptoms and on the implications of those symptoms” 
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(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). The response style theory of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991) proposes that individuals differ in their reaction to negative mood states and that 
rumination is a trait-like response style to distress. Individuals are engaged in depressive 
rumination because they believe that ruminating about their mood and symptoms will help to 
understand themselves better. However, rather than leading to increased self-understanding, 
depressive rumination augments sad mood and negative thinking by focusing attention on 
current mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). Later, it was proposed that the 
harmful effects of rumination stem not from attention to distress per se, but from self-focused 
attention that is negative, evaluative and judgmental (Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007).  
To assess individual differences in the tendency to ruminate, Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow (1991) developed the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). This scale has high internal 
consistency and acceptable convergent validity (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Various versions of this 22-item scale have been used in  
numerous studies over the years. Factor analyses of the RRS have identified two distinct 
subtypes of rumination (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). The first, reflective 
pondering, is a more adaptive form of rumination and reflects the degree to which individuals 
engage in cognitive problem solving to improve their mood. The second, depressive brooding, 
is a more maladaptive form of rumination and reflects the degree to which individuals 
passively focus on symptoms of distress and the meaning of those symptoms. Both rumination 
scales involve focusing on distress, but the brooding scale contains more self-critical, 
evaluative, and judgmental statements (Rude et al., 2007). Depression is specifically 
characterized by high levels of brooding (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 
2006; Treynor et al., 2003).  
Rumination in response to negative mood increases vulnerability to depression. 
Experimental studies testing the effects of rumination have generally used the rumination 
UNDERSTANDING DEPRESSIVE RUMINATION 
6 
 
induction procedure developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). This procedure 
increases ruminative thinking and has been shown to heighten  and prolong negative mood 
and cognition  in dysphorics (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993) and in clinically depressed participants (Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lavender & 
Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Induction of 
rumination also hampers problem solving and task performance (Watkins & Brown, 2002). In 
addition, numerous studies have demonstrated that rumination is associated concurrently with 
depressive symptoms (Treynor et al., 2003) and prospectively with the onset (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000), severity (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and 
duration (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) of depression, and recovery from depression (Kuehner, & 
Weber, 1999; Schmaling, Dimidjian, Katon, & Sullivan, 2002). 
 
2. The Impaired Disengagement Hypothesis 
Despite marked progression in the understanding of the affective consequences of 
rumination, there is less clarity on the underlying mechanisms of rumination. We argue that 
information-processing factors play a crucial role in rumination. We will first outline a basic 
model of information-processing in  rumination and will subsequently discuss the empirical 
evidence for each of its  specific components. 
 
2.1 Basic Assumptions of the Model 
Engaging in rumination, be it pondering or brooding, in response to major life events, 
negative mood states, or relatively minor stressors (such as an awkward social encounter) is 
considered a normal, non-pathological process. This process of critical contextual and self-
evaluation helps us  make sense of events in our social environment or personal history (see 
Carver & Scheier, 1998). We refer to this process as „cued rumination‟ . We postulate 
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difficulty to disengage attention as the central engine that puts individuals at risk for 
heightened levels of rumination and brooding in particular. That is, individuals who are 
characterized by a difficulty to exercise attentional control in response to negative thoughts 
are likely to experience persistent rumination. Attentional control is broadly conceived here 
and refers to the ability to selectively attend to task-relevant information and to inhibit 
distraction by task-irrelevant information. 
 Important to note here, rumination is influenced by factors other than information-
processing. Clearly, heightened levels of negative affect and/or the frequent encounter of 
stressful events are associated with enhanced attempts to understand these feelings and events 
(see also Martin & Tesser, 1996). However, these factors cannot explain why rumination 
persists despite the absence of highly stressful events or other unmet goals. The latter can be 
observed in individuals with recurrent depression who develop new depressive episodes upon 
encounter of relatively mild stressors (Monroe et al., 2006) and have high levels of 
rumination. Given that information-processing factors related to attention and executive 
function determine to a large extent the contents of working memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), 
these factors may play an important role. It is noteworthy that we are not the first to suggest 
that information-processing factors contribute to rumination. For instance, Linville (1996) 
proposed that deficient inhibition is a risk factor for heightened levels of intrusions in working 
memory. However, our proposal goes beyond this prediction in being more specific on the 
factors involved  in integrating cognitive as well as affective neuroscience data. First, we will 
describe the nature of this attentional problem in more detail. We will then review the extant 
research that has investigated the association between rumination and information processing 
deficits.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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2.2 Impaired Disengagement Hypothesis 
A schematic outline of the impaired disengagement hypothesis is provided in Figure 1. 
We assume that certain internal (e.g., negative affect or memories) or external stressors that 
conflict with an individuals‟ goals cue ruminative thoughts. For instance, being confronted 
with a stressor such as a job loss, an argument with one‟s spouse or receiving criticism will 
elicit thoughts about the causes of these stressors. Clearly, the nature of such thinking is 
analytical and self-critical in looking at one‟s contribution to the problem, and this is likely to 
elicit a negative mood state. This is a normal process that is crucial in the deliberate regulation 
of one‟s behavior. This critical thinking is terminated when a solution to the problem is 
reached or, in the absence of a solution, when the individual engages in either automatic or 
deliberate emotion regulation. 
In most individuals self-critical negative thoughts typically are not in line with existing 
positive self views. Therefore after some time these thoughts (or the affiliated negative mood) 
will cause the signaling of cognitive conflict. In line with emerging literature on emotion 
regulation, this signaling of conflict can occur at the automatic as well as at the strategic level 
(see Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). In most individuals this conflict signaling is followed by 
the disengagement of attention from negative thoughts. The successful disengagement of 
attention from negative thoughts then allows to reappraise the situation or distract from the 
situation altogether by focusing attention on other (task-relevant) stimuli or more positive 
distracters. Note that avoidance of negative information is quite frequently observed in non-
depressed, control participants (see De Raedt & Koster, 2010, for a review). 
There are multiple ways in which this initial stage of conflict signaling and attentional 
allocation can be disrupted. This may be due to either impaired conflict signaling or intact 
conflict signaling but reduced attentional control. In the first option (i.e., impaired conflict 
signaling), in individuals with negative self schemas (cf. Clark et al., 1999), negative thoughts 
UNDERSTANDING DEPRESSIVE RUMINATION 
9 
 
about oneself will elicit less cognitive conflict and therefore attentional resources will not be 
reallocated. Indeed, there is emerging evidence that conflict signaling is reduced for negative 
material when individuals are in a negative mood state (Foti & Hajcak, 2010). The absence of 
conflict signaling will be associated with a sustained attentional focus on self-referring 
negative information. Interestingly, recent neurophysiological data show that conflict 
monitoring reduces with increasing number of depressive episodes (Vanderhasselt & De 
Raedt, 2010). 
In the second option, sustained attention for self-referring negative information is 
observed due to impaired attentional control. At this point there are important reciprocal 
relations between rumination, attentional control, and depression. First, depressive episodes 
are characterized by a general reduction in attentional control. Many studies have documented 
an overall reduction of attentional control in depression (e.g., Merriam, Thase, Haas, 
Keshavan, & Sweeney, 1999). It is noteworthy though that this reduced attentional control is 
not of very large magnitude and mostly found in severely depressed individuals (see for a 
review, Joormann et al., 2007). However, depression is characterized by valence-specific 
impaired attentional control. Attentional control is markedly lower in the presence of self-
relevant negative information. There now is converging evidence to show that clinical as well 
as sub-clinical depression is characterized by an attentional bias in favor of negative material. 
This effect is mainly observed when self-relevant negative information is presented for longer 
durations (see De Raedt & Koster, 2010, for a review). Finally, there is evidence suggesting 
reduced functional connectivity between neural structures involved in conflict signaling  and 
the implementation of attentional control (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). An more extensive 
overview of the neural mechanisms associated with impaired attentional control. 
Importantly, previous research has shown that such persistent rumination is associated 
with impaired problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), reduced performance on other 
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tasks (e.g., Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003), and with negative affect (Thomsen, 
Jorgensen, Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004). In previous theories it is held that hyper-
accessibility of negative thought content reduces the effectiveness of executive functions and 
depletes attentional resources from problem solving (e.g., Watkins & Brown, 2002). At this 
point more specific hypotheses can be formulated based on research into the influence of 
emotion on cognition. It is thought that negative mood narrows the attentional focus, which 
may cause an attentional funneling effect (see Clore & Gasper, 2000). That is, the narrowing 
of attention is associated with heightened importance of the emotional information that is 
within the focus of attention, which in turns intensifies the emotional state causing a further 
reduction of goal space. These three factors nicely explain why enhanced self-focused 
attention is associated with impaired problem solving and executive functioning. Indeed, there 
is evidence that sad compared with positive mood is associated with a more focused attention 
and less creative thinking (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007).  
There is an important reciprocal relation between the affective and cognitive 
consequences of rumination. That is, negative affect, impaired problem solving and task 
impairments can become important cues that trigger further negative cognitions and 
rumination.  
A final but crucial proposal is that if individuals become trapped in this vicious cycle, 
rumination becomes a habitual mode of thinking. Where initially rumination may be goal-
directed and engage attentional resources, persistent rumination is characterized by reduced 
quality of thinking with attention being deployed to negative thoughts in a less constructive 
way (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). This observation may be caused by the combination of 
attentional funneling and the strengthening of associative thinking along similar in the context 
of reduced attentional control. This persistent rumination is related to depressive rumination 
or brooding. As this becomes an habitual form of thinking, we propose that this type of 
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rumination is associated with a large reduction in deliberate allocation of attentional 
resources. The empirical research on several elements of our proposal is discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
  
2.3 Research Findings 
In this section we will review the literature on the association between rumination, 
attention, and depressive symptoms. Note that many of the studies included here have  
examined individuals (undergraduates) with elevated depressive symptoms, who generally 
show elevated levels of rumination. It has been demonstrated that  individuals who show  
heightened levels of subclinical depressive symptoms are at risk for developing clinical 
depression  (Fergusson, Horwood, Ridder & Beautrais, 2005). In most of the studies we 
discuss below, statistical procedures have been used to examine the association between 
rumination and attentional control functions, while controlling for depression scores.  
2.3.1 Rumination and General Attentional Control 
With regard to the specific cognitive operations related to attentional control, factor 
analysis of tasks measuring facets of attentional control revealed three functions that are 
moderately correlated with one another but are clearly separable: (1) monitoring and updating 
of working memory representations, (2) inhibition and (3) mental set shifting (Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). The functions most frequently related to 
depression and rumination  are inhibition and set shifting. Cognitive inhibition refers to the 
ability to effectively inhibit the processing of previously relevant or irrelevant distracting 
information. The set shifting function concerns the ability to shift back and forth between 
multiple tasks, operations or mental sets (Monsell, 1996). 
There is converging evidence showing that higher levels of rumination are negatively 
correlated with attentional control. An early study by Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) 
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showed that ruminators versus non-ruminators committed more perserverative errors on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. The aim of the WCST is to determine what rule should be used 
to sort target cards to match key cards that vary in stimulus dimensions. Feedback is given to 
participants about correct and incorrect matches and they must be able to adjust their 
performance when the rule unexpectedly changes. Ruminators persisted in performing the 
task according to the old rule despite receiving feedback that their matches were incorrect, 
suggesting a lack of cognitive flexibility. In this study, ruminators did not differ from non-
ruminators on other measures of working memory or task switching, such as a backward digit 
span. However, these tasks were all administered in a non-selected undergraduate sample, 
which potentially reduced the chance to find large differences between ruminators and non-
ruminators.  
Using a mixed antisaccade paradigm with neutral stimuli, a recent study examined 
whether rumination was related to inhibition and shifting impairments (De Lissnyder, 
Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, submitted). In a typical antisaccade paradigm participants are 
instructed to inhibit an eye-movement in response to an abrupt peripheral cue and to 
simultaneously generate a volitional saccade to its mirror position on the screen. Performance 
on antisaccade trials is compared with prosaccade trials where participants are instructed to 
simply look at the cue and so inhibition is not required. Ruminators compared with non-
ruminators found it difficult to inhibit orienting towards the abrupt cue as indicated by their 
longer antisaccade latencies. Interestingly, these inhibition impairments were specifically 
related to depressive brooding. No effects of rumination were observed on shifting capacity.  
A recent study by Whitmer and Banich (2007) investigated inhibition and  set shifting 
in relation to  different types of rumination. They  used  a task switching paradigm  to 
determine if attentional control impairments in ruminators were associated with inhibition or 
set shifting impairments in the context of non-emotional information. Participants  had to 
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perform an odd-one-out search based on a stimulus dimension (color, motion, orientation) that 
was cued prior to a stimulus display. Through presentation of specific trial sequences, the 
authors could disentangle between inhibition of previous task settings and task switching. It 
was found that the two types of rumination, reflective pondering and brooding, were 
associated with different attentional control dysfunctions. Brooding was specifically 
associated with impaired inhibition. In a recent extension of this study (De Lissnyder, Koster, 
Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2010) using a modified task that examined set shifting and 
inhibition in response to non-emotional as well as emotional information, it was shown that  
brooding was related to valence-specific inhibitory problems as well as set-shifting 
impairments (see below).  
 
2.3.2 Rumination and Valence-specific Attentional Bias 
The association between rumination and valence-specific attentional bias has been 
investigated in a number of studies. One interesting study used the dot probe task for this 
purpose for (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007). In the dot probe task, pairs of stimuli – 
with one neutral and one emotional stimulus - are presented at separate spatial locations and 
one of these stimuli is replaced by a task-relevant probe (e.g., a dot). The logic of this task that 
if individuals systematically orient towards an emotional stimulus, responding to probes 
presented at the location of the emotional stimulus is faster than responding to probes that 
appear at the opposite location of the emotional stimulus. This task that included negative 
words as stimuli was presented to a sample of depressed patients. The results  showed that 
trait rumination was associated with an attentional bias for negative words, even when 
depressive symptoms were statistically controlled for (Donaldson et al., 2007).  
Another line of studies used an affective variant of the negative priming paradigm 
(Joormann, 2004) to investigate valence-specific inhibitory deficits in keeping information 
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from entering working memory. In this paradigm, participants must ignore the emotional 
valence of an irrelevant stimulus on a first trial. On a subsequent trial this ignored emotional 
information either becomes task-relevant or is not task-relevant. The idea is that it takes 
longer to respond to a previously ignored stimulus because one has to overcome inhibition. If 
this response slowing is not observed than this indicates impaired inhibition. Such inhibition 
impairments for negative information have been observed in dysphoric (Joormann, 2004) as 
well as clinically depressed individuals (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006). 
Joormann (2006) found that an increased tendency to depressively ruminate was associated 
with impaired inhibition of negative words. Thus, it could be that the impaired inhibition of 
negative information enhances the amount of negative information that enters working 
memory. The study by De Lissnyder et al. (2010) confirmed this  hypothesis as impaired 
inhibition of negative information was best predicted by depressive rumination. Although, no 
association between rumination and inhibition of negative faces was found in a depressed 
sample (Goeleven et al., 2006), this may be explained by the fact that rumination is a verbal 
processes with a stronger linkage to verbal compared with pictorial material.  
In addition to the ability to keep emotional material from entering working memory, the 
ability to remove emotional information from working memory is also of major importance in 
rumination. Joormann and Gotlib (2008) used  an affective modification of the Sternberg task 
to study this phenomenon. In their study, participants first memorized two short lists of 
emotional words. A cue then indicated that only one of the two lists would be relevant. The 
design implicated that participants had to remove the irrelevant (emotional) information from 
working memory. Shortly after the cue, a probe word appeared and participants had to 
indicate whether it was from the relevant list. Depressed individuals had more difficulty 
removing negative words from working memory. Interestingly, a regression analysis showed 
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that the  difficulty in inhibiting negative words was associated with depressive rumination 
even when depression scores were controlled for.  
Taken together, the evidence discussed above (see also Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Joormann, 
2006) indicates that rumination and brooding in particular are associated with impairments 
and valence-specific biases in attentional control functions. It is interesting to note that, in 
most of the studies discussed below, the association between rumination and attentional 
control remained significant even when depression scores were controlled for. This finding is 
in line with the idea that information-processing impairments make it difficult for ruminators 
to disengage from negative content. This could mean that such cognitive control deficits  may 
be  causally related to the persistence of depressive cognition. Obviously, given the 
correlational nature of the empirical data we cannot draw any firm conclusions about the 
causal relationship between rumination and information-processing. Thus, it could still be the 
case that rumination leads to impaired attentional control, instead of attentional impairments 
being causally involved in the emergence and maintenance of rumination.  
In a recent prospective study, we examined whether inter-individual differences in 
cognitive control ability, measured in a task where individuals had to switch between 
emotional and non-emotional material held in working memory, plays a moderating role in 
the association between the occurrence of a stressful event and the tendency to ruminate (De 
Lissnyder, Koster, Goubert, Onraedt, & De Raedt, submitted). Results revealed that impaired 
cognitive control measured at time one, reflected in larger switch costs, moderated the 
association between stress and increased rumination during a stressful period later in time. 
Interestingly, a larger switch cost when processing emotional material was associated with 
increased depressive brooding in response to stress. The prospective nature of the design also 
allows the interpretation  that the association between rumination and information-processing 
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is not simply due to rumination depleting cognitive resources. Instead, our results are in line 
with the idea that impaired cognitive control contributes to rumination. 
Moreover, there are also clues from affective neuroscience pointing towards a strong 
association between rumination and attentional control impairments, and that depressive 
rumination is not linked to top-down attempts to understand negative life events and mood but 
to the depletion of attentional resources. We will now turn to this literature. 
  
3. Rumination and Attentional Control: Clues from Affective Neuroscience 
Depression is associated with hypoactivation in cortical structures involved in 
attentional control which can be related to impaired emotion regulation. There is a wealth of 
research showing an enhanced amygdala activity upon the encounter of stress in depression, 
with the amygdala being primarily implicated in processing of negative emotions. In a study 
by Siegle and colleagues (Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002) depressed 
individuals showed sustained amygdala responses to negative words that  lasted during a 
following task that involved non-emotional processing. The difference in sustained amygdala 
activity to negative versus positive words was related to rumination. This increased amygdala 
activity has been linked to impaired cognitive control exerted by specific regions of the 
prefrontal cortex (Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, Putnam, 2002; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008) 
onto limbic emotion processing, as reflected by lower regulatory activity in the frontal 
cortices as well as a reduced connectivity between the amygdala and these frontal cortex 
regions during emotion processing in depression. The reciprocal interplay between cognitive 
control and emotion has been underpinned by many neuro-imaging studies, demonstrating 
emerging evidence for a widely distributed and functionally interactive network of cortical-
limbic pathways that play a central role in the regulation of sustained negative mood 
(Johnstone, Van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Wager, 
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Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). With regard to depression, it has been 
proposed that a deficient regulation of sustained negative affect is related to a failure to 
recruit the dorsal top-down control over the amygdala due to excessive bottom-up 
suppression by the ventral system and a primary dorsal system pathology (Taylor & 
Fragopagonos, 2002; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch & Lane, 2003).   
First, emotional stimuli activate the amygdala (Zald, 2003), which in turn signals to 
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). The ACC can be seen as a bridge between subcortical 
emotion processing and cognitive control, integrating signals from the ventral ACC and the 
dorsal ACC (Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000), the latter being involved in conflict monitoring and 
the facilitation of task-appropriate response selection (Macdonald, Cohen, Stenger & Carter, 
2000). The ACC in turn sends signals to the DLPFC to increase attentional control and 
modify the distribution of processing resources (Hopfinger, Buonocore & Mangun, 2000; 
Macdonald et al., 2000). Previous research in depression has found despite signaling of 
cognitive control in an error detection paradigm, the adjustment to errors was impaired in 
depressed individuals because of reduced connectivity between the ACC and the prefrontal 
cortex (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007). Due to these reasons there may remain an inward focused 
attention, with persistent rumination. In the case of normal connectivity, the DLPFC can 
initiate emotion regulation, inhibiting the amygdala (Davidson et al., 2002) via connections 
with other frontal regions such as the orbitofrontal (OFC) cortex (Taylor & Fragopaganos, 
2005). 
The neural underpinnings of specific habitual thinking styles such as rumination can 
also be linked to the broader default-mode-network (DMN), a set of brain regions with 
consistently decreased neural activity during goal-oriented tasks (Shulman et al., 1997). The 
brain structures involved in the default mode network (DMN) include precuneus/posterior 
cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex and medial, lateral and inferior parietal cortex 
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(Raichle, 2001). Although deactivated during task performance, this network is active in the 
resting brain with a high degree of functional connectivity between regions. This resting state 
activity has been termed the default-mode of brain activity to denote a state in which an 
individual is awake and alert, but not actively involved in an attention demanding or goal-
directed task (Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard, & Shulman, 2001). The DMN 
has in several studies been linked to psychological functions of introspective and self-
referential thought (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Mason, Norton, Van 
Horn, Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007). For the present purposes it is noteworthy to 
mention  that the negative correlation between the DMN and the task positive network (the 
brain network activated during tasks) has led to the idea that there is a switching between 
introspective and extrospective attention, this being linked to the DMN and the task-positive 
network, respectively (Broyd, Demanuele, Debener, Helps, James, & Sonuga-Barke, 2009). 
In recent years, the DMN has been linked to several forms of psychopathology, 
including depression. The ruminative, self-referential focus of depressed patients has led to 
predictions of differences between this clinical group and controls in terms of DMN 
connectivity (Greicius, Flores, Menon, Glover, Solvason, Kenna, et al., 2007). Following 
analysis of resting state fMRI data, the ventral subgenual ACC was found to contribute 
disproportionally to the connectivity of the DMN in this patient group, with increases in 
connectivity associated with the length of the current depressive episode (Greicius et al., 
2007). There was also increased functional connectivity in the thalamus during rest. Greicius 
et al. (2007) suggest that increased connectivity in „affective‟ regions may detrimentally affect 
connectivity in regions associated with cognitive processing such as the dorsal ACC. In a 
recent study examining the default mode network in depression comparing resting conditions 
(looking at negative and positive pictures) with an active reappraisal condition has shown that 
depression is characterized by a failure to regulate activity in neural structures (amygdala, 
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parahippocampus, hippocampus), associated with the DMN (Sheline, Barch, Price, Rundle, 
Vaishnavi, Snyder, et al. 2009). 
Taken together, the finding that self-reflective thoughts are associated with the DMN 
which is anti-correlated with areas involved in attentional control suggests that ruminative 
thought may be a habitual mode of thinking in depressed individuals, going over negative 
events past repeatedly, without marked difficulties to control this type of thinking, or to 
engage in the active reappraisal of events past. These findings are not in line with the idea that 
depressive rumination is driven by top-down processes, related to attempts to make sense of 
negative events and mood. Instead these data provide some indication for the inability to or 
absence of effortful control over depressive cognition as rumination depletes attentional 
resources.  
 
4. Clinical Implications 
Conceptualizing rumination as being mainly driven by information-processing 
deficiencies has specific implications for clinical treatment of rumination. With regard to 
psychological treatments, traditional cognitive therapy for depression which is considered one 
of the most efficacious treatments for depression (Hollon & Dimidjian, 2009) would use 
verbal interventions that target negative thinking through challenging some of the core beliefs 
that are reported by the depressed individual. Other well-investigated forms of psychotherapy, 
such as interpersonal therapy also mainly use verbal techniques to improve depressive 
cognition. From our perspective, it might be unrealistic to assume that verbal interventions 
can readily change a habitual thinking style if attentional control is not improved first, and this 
could be the reason for the important problem of relapse. Therefore, it could be more sensible 
to aim at improving and restoring attentional control when trying to improve depressive 
cognition. Recently, important advances have been made in the area of cognitive methodology 
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that allows to improve either attentional control functioning (see Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 
2007) or valence-specific processing biases (see MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). 
 Interestingly, there is also emerging research suggesting that several biological 
interventions that are commonly used to treat depression may operate in part through 
influences on attentional control. Importantly, several studies have shown that therapeutic 
effects of antidepressant medication are related to changes in cognitive processing of 
emotional information, with some of these studies showing that changes in cognitive 
processing of emotional information precede and predict the affective effects of antidepressant 
medication (see Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010). Similar findings have been found in 
relation to repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation over the DLPFC, which is a relatively 
new intervention (Avery, Holtzheimer, Fawaz, Russo, Neumaier, Dunner, et al. 2006; 
Bortolomasi, Minelli, Fuggetta, Perini, Comencini, Fiaschi, et al. 2007). Research indicates 
that the effectiveness of multi-session rTMS in reducing depressive symptoms is preceded by 
increased attentional control (Vanderhasselt et al., 2009). Thus, there is increasing evidence 
suggesting that existing treatments for depression and depressive cognition may operate 
through influences on attentional control. 
As an increasing number of depressive episodes is associated with lower stress reactivity 
(Monroe & Hakness, 2005) and increasing risk of developing new depressive episodes 
(Keller, 2003), it could be useful to target attentional control as a proximal risk factors for the 
development of first or recurrent depressive episodes. Computerized programs to improve 
attentional control are relatively easy to disseminate and may have protective effects in at-risk 
individuals (see Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2001; Siegle et al., 2007). It is important that 
future research addresses the clinical potential of such prevention or treatment programs. 
 
5. Future Challenges 
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The impaired disengagement hypothesis provides a useful framework for 
understanding the persistence of rumination in depression. At a broader level there is 
emerging cognitive as well as biological research pointing to the relevance of attentional 
factors in depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Despite the wealth of correlational data 
indicating the link between attentional control and rumination, an important area of 
investigation will be to test the directional hypothesis that attentional factors contribute to the 
persistence of rumination. Although this is a plausible hypothesis given the available 
literature, further research is necessary to stringently test this hypothesis. This requires more 
prospective studies as well as research where attentional control is experimentally 
manipulated. 
In addition, besides highly focused research examining the specific relation between 
attentional control and rumination, it will also be important to investigate this association in a 
broader framework to understand these factors in relation to depression. That is, it is 
conceivable that certain risk factors for depression have direct or indirect relations to 
attentional control and rumination. For instance, sleep disturbances are a well-established risk 
factor for depression, that are not only present during depressive episodes but also precede 
these episodes (Fichter, Kohlboeck, Quadflieg, Wyschkon, & Esser, 2009). In relation to the 
framework presented here, one could hypothesize that sleep disturbances may be related to 
depression through its influence on attentional control and rumination. In order to investigate 
such functional relations between, large-scale research is needed to carefully map the 
temporal relations between different aspects of psychological functioning.  
In sum, we have argued that attentional control plays an important role in explaining 
depressive rumination. The present framework may assist in deriving new and focused 
hypotheses about risk factors for depression and their treatment.  
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Figure caption 
 Figure 1. A schematic outline of the impaired disengagement model of rumination 
 
 
